Prudence, Emotional State, Personality, and Cognitive Ability by Adriana Breaban et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 28 October 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01688
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1688
Edited by:
Nikolaos Georgantzis,
University of Reading, UK
Reviewed by:
Michalis Drouvelis,
University of Birmingham, UK
Sascha Behnk,
University of Zurich, Switzerland
*Correspondence:
Adriana Breaban
a.breaban@uvt.nl
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Personality and Social Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 29 June 2016
Accepted: 13 October 2016
Published: 28 October 2016
Citation:
Breaban A, van de Kuilen G and
Noussair CN (2016) Prudence,
Emotional State, Personality, and
Cognitive Ability.
Front. Psychol. 7:1688.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01688
Prudence, Emotional State,
Personality, and Cognitive Ability
Adriana Breaban 1*, Gijs van de Kuilen 1 and Charles N. Noussair 2
1Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands, 2Department of Economics, University of Arizona,
Tucson, AZ, USA
We report an experiment to consider the emotional correlates of prudent decision
making. In the experiment, we present subjects with lotteries andmeasure their emotional
response with facial recognition software. They then make binary choices between risky
lotteries that distinguish prudent from imprudent individuals. They also perform tasks to
measure their cognitive ability and a number of personality characteristics. We find that a
more negative emotional state correlates with greater prudence. Higher cognitive ability
and less conscientiousness is also associated with greater prudence.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of the role of risk preferences in decision making has primarily focused on the
implications of risk aversion, i.e., the preference for a certain payment to a lottery with the same
expected value. If one assumes that individuals maximize expected utility (e.g., for prescriptive
applications), risk aversion implies that the utility function for money is concave (i.e., that
u”(x) < 0). However, empirical work has shown that the degree of risk aversion is often affected by
psychological factors not captured by the expected utility model, such as the perceived likelihood of
events and the perceived domain of the outcomes (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Moreover,
theoretical work has shown that risk aversion is not the only facet of preference governing economic
decision making: it is becoming increasingly recognized that the higher order risk attitudes of
prudence and temperance complement the role of risk aversion in economic decision making
in important ways. For example, in the realm of saving behavior, while risk aversion drives the
preference to smooth consumption over time (consumption smoothing; Friedman, 1957), prudence
determines how saving behavior changes as future income becomes riskier (precautionary saving;
Kimball, 1990). Other examples of areas of economics, in which higher order risk preferences have
been found to play an important role in influencing behavior, include bidding in auctions (Esö
andWhite, 2004), bargaining (White, 2008), tax compliance (Alm, 1988), and rent seeking (Treich,
2010).
Within the expected utility framework, prudence is typically defined as the convexity of marginal
utility (u”’(x) > 0), while temperance is equivalent to a negative fourth derivative of the utility
function (u””(x) < 0). However, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) have introduced behavioral
definitions, based on observable revealed preferences, of prudence and temperance that are model-
free in the sense that they retain validity if expected utility fails to accurately describe choice
behavior (e.g., see Starmer, 2000). The definitions of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) are based on
risk apportionment. In particular, a decision maker (DM) is prudent if she prefers to apportion an
unavoidable zero-mean risk to a relatively high rather than to a low wealth state, while a temperate
DM prefers to apportion two independent zero-mean risks across different states of nature.
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Several recent papers have used the behavioral definitions of
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) to quantify higher-order risk
preferences empirically. The results from these studies show that
the degree of prudence varies considerably among individuals
within the population (Deck and Schlesinger, 2010, 2014; Ebert
and Wiesen, 2011, 2014; Noussair et al., 2014), though all of
these studies agree that a majority of individuals are prudent.
Furthermore, Noussair et al. (2014), who study a large sample of
demographically representative individuals, find that those who
exhibit more prudent decision making also have greater savings,
lower debt, more wealth and higher educational attainment. The
results for the prevalence of temperance within the population
are more mixed (e.g., Deck and Schlesinger, 2010, 2014; Noussair
et al., 2014).
It is also widely recognized in behavioral economics,
psychology, and management, that there is an important
connection between emotional state and risk preferences.
However, research in this area has focused exclusively on the
link between emotional state and risk aversion. This research
can be classified based on whether it considers the relationship
between risk taking and overall valence (positivity or negativity
of emotional state), or to specific emotions such as fear, anger,
and happiness, as correlates of decision making. Johnson and
Tversky (1983) propose that a positively-valenced emotional
state increases risk taking, because it makes beliefs about
outcomes more optimistic. This relationship is termed the
Affective Generalization Hypothesis. On the other hand, Isen et al.
(1988) have argued that a positive mood leads to less risk taking
because individuals wish to preserve the positive emotional state
and insulate themselves from negative outcomes. This is referred
to as theMood Maintenance Hypothesis.
In addition to overall valence, specific emotions have been
associated with risk taking. The Appraisal Tendency Framework
(Lerner and Tiedens, 2006) predicts that the emotion of fear is
associated with greater risk aversion, while anger and happiness
are correlated with greater risk taking. These propositions are
supported by experimental studies (Lerner and Keltner, 2001;
Kugler et al., 2012), in which emotions are induced prior to a
risky choice task. Recent work by Nguyen and Noussair (2014),
in which emotions are observed and tracked rather than induced,
reports that fear, happiness, and anger all correlate positively
with risk aversion, while emotional valence correlates negatively
with risk aversion (negative emotions are associated with risk
aversion).
Theoretical work, shows that those who are imprudent save
less when their background risk increases (Kimball, 1990),
behavior which may be financially hazardous for them as well
as socially undesirable. Moreover, previous work has shown
that imprudence correlates with poor decision-making (Noussair
et al., 2014). In short, imprudent people get into financial
trouble. It is, therefore, interesting and valuable to know what
correlates with imprudent decision making. One factor that
might get in the way of making good decisions are strong
emotions. In this study, we consider which emotional states
correlate with imprudent financial decisions. While research
on the connection between emotions and risk aversion has
established clear and important relationships, nothing is known
about the correlation between emotional state and higher order
risk attitudes. In this paper, we consider the relationship between
prudent decision making and emotional state. Our design is
guided by the theoretical work of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger
(2006) and the experimental implementation of Deck and
Schlesinger (2010, 2014). Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) show
how prudent and imprudent decisions can be distinguished
using risk apportionment tasks that are simple to understand
and straightforward to implement in the laboratory. Just as
the willingness to accept a zero-mean risk can distinguish a
risk averse from a risk seeking individual, a preference for
accepting an unavoidable zero-mean risk in a relatively high,
rather than a low, income state can reveal prudence. Even though
this behavioral definition of prudence is model-free (just like
the definition of risk aversion as a preference for the expected
value of a lottery over the lottery itself is), a preference for
assigning unavoidable risk to relatively high income states implies
convex marginal utility or u”’(x) > 0, if one assumes that the
DM maximizes expected utility (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger,
2006).
We design and report an experiment that consists of two
phases. In the first phase, participants are presented with a series
of ten lotteries, in which two different payoff levels are equally
likely. Each lottery is resolved after it is displayed. In the second
phase of a session, subjects make choices between lotteries. The
decisions have the feature that they offer a choice between two
lotteries that are equivalent in terms of mean and variance, but
that differ in skewness by varying whether they apportion risk to
a high or low income state. We consider whether the emotional
response to the presentation of the lotteries in the initial phase
correlates with subsequent decisions. Additionally, we investigate
correlations between some characteristics of individuals and their
level of prudence. We measure our participants’ cognitive ability
using Raven’s test of progressive matrices (Bors and Stokes, 1998)
and personality traits as captured by the Big Five inventory
(Gosling et al., 2003), and relate these to the decisions they
make.
Our experiment shows that decisions depend on emotional
state. The emotional state of participants in phase 1 of the
experiment correlates with the level of prudence in their phase
2 decisions. More positive valence correlates with less prudent
choices. Changes in arousal during the display of the prospects
in the first phase of the experiment does correlate with decisions,
with greater increases in arousal associated with more prudent
choices. Our results as a whole indicate that stronger emotions
tend to be associated with greater prudence, though all else equal,
more positive emotional state correlates with less prudence. This
pattern of results is similar to those observed by Nguyen and
Noussair (2014) for risk aversion. They found that stronger
emotions were correlated with more risk averse choices, and
positive valence with less risk averse choices. We also observe
that greater cognitive ability, as measured by the Raven’s test
score, is associated with greater prudence. This last result is
in line with those reported by Noussair et al. (2014), using a
different measure of cognitive ability, the Cognitive Reflection
Test (Frederick, 2005). We also observe that conscientiousness
correlates negatively with prudence.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
The Participants and the Setting
Eighty-three students from Tilburg University in the Netherlands
participated in this computerized experiment, which was
conducted at the CentER laboratory at Tilburg University in
20161. There were six experimental sessions, each involving
between 7 and 19 subjects. The majority of subjects studied
economics. The average age was 22.5 years and 50.6% of the
subjects were female.
The subjects were recruited among a pool of volunteers and
were told that the experiment would last for up to 1 h. The
experiment was programmed in Ztree (Fischbacher, 2007). The
experiment consisted of four phases. At the start of each phase 1
to 3, separate instructions were read aloud. Instructions can be
found online in the Data Sheet 1. During the experiment, facial
expressions were recorded continuously by using video cameras.
After completing the experiment, subjects were paid in private.
Procedures and Data Gathered
In the first phase of the experiment, subjects were presented with
10 risky lotteries, displayed sequentially. Each lottery involved
a 50/50 chance of receiving either a low or a high outcome
with outcomes ranging from e1 to e13, and expected values
ranging from e3.5 to e8.5. The lotteries displayed in phase 1
were unrelated to the lotteries that were presented later in the
experiment.
After being presented on the screen, the lottery was resolved
for each individual and the outcome of the lottery was then
displayed on the screen for 10 s.2 Then, the next lottery appeared
on the screen. The purpose of the first phase was to observe the
emotional reaction caused by merely being exposed to risk and
the emotional reaction caused by experiencing the outcome of
the risky option. We register the emotion data at the time of
presentation of the lottery itself, which we refer to as the exposure
emotions. We also measure emotional state at the time each
lottery is resolved and we refer to these as feedback emotions. In
addition, we also retain for analysis the emotional state before
the beginning of the experiment, and designate these as initial
emotions.
The emotions are measured in the following manner. We
videotape participants for the entire session with their consent.
The videotapes are then analyzed with Noldus FaceReaderTM
software, which tracks facial expressions and analyzes the
emotions they display. FaceReader has been employed in a
1Tilburg University, where the experiment was conducted, does not have an
Institutional Review Board. This is fully in line with Dutch law, which does not
require IRB review for social science research. Subjects gave verbal consent to be
videotaped. However, they were unaware that their facial expressions would be
analyzed.
2When single emotions occur and there is no reason for them to be modified
or concealed, expressions typically last between 0.5 to 4 seconds and involve the
entire face (Ekman, 2003). The onset and offset of a sincere emotional response in
reaction to a stimulus is generally between 2/3 of a second and 4 seconds (Hager
and Ekman, 1985; Hess and Kleck, 1990). Thus, the 10 second window that we
study should capture the full reaction to exposure to the lottery or to feedback
from the lottery outcome. The relatively long time horizon in which we measure
emotional state at the beginning of the experiment, allows us a relatively large
amount of data on subjects’ initial mood at the outset of the session.
number of experimental economics studies focusing on emotions
(e.g., Breaban and Noussair, 2014; Nguyen and Noussair, 2014;
Van Leeuwen et al., 2014; Habetinova and Noussair, 2015), but
has also been used in marketing (Teixeira et al., 2012; Lewinski
et al., 2014), and in psychological (Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai,
2010), research.
The FaceReader software tracks facial movements using the
Facial Action Coding System, which associates specific muscle
movements to the six basic universal emotions cataloged by Paul
Ekman and his colleagues (e.g., Ekman et al., 1987; Ekman and
Friesen, 2003). The emotions are happiness, fear, anger, disgust,
surprise, and sadness. Facereader also measures how closely a
facial expression conforms to a neutral state and generates an
overall measure of emotional valence, as well as of arousal. The
valence measure is calculated as Happiness—max{Anger, Fear,
Sadness, Disgust}, that is, the value of the only positive emotion,
happiness, minus the strongest of the four negative emotions.
Arousal is a measure of emotional activation that varies from
0 to 1 and it is calculated as the average of the current highest
five activation indicators corrected by a continuous average
of activation during the last 60 s. The specific emotions are
computed on a scale from 0 to 1, with one indicating complete
conformity of facial movements to those associated with an
emotion. It registers emotional state 30 times per second.
To compute the initial value of an emotion, we average the
registered value of the emotion over the 60 s before phase 1
of the experiment began. During this period, subjects had no
task to perform, and were passively waiting for the experiment
to start. Exposure emotions represent the average over the 10 s
during which a lottery is presented, and feedback emotions are
computed as the average over the 10 s immediately following the
resolution of the lottery.
The second phase of the experiment involves 10 direct
pairwise choices. Each consists of a choice between one lottery
that would be preferred by a prudent individual and an
alternative that would be preferred by a decision maker who is
imprudent. An example of a choice as presented to participants
can be can be found in Figure 1. In both phases, all subjects were
presented with all lotteries in the same order.
In the example of a choice shown in the figure, with 50%
probability Left yields e10 and an additional 50/50 lottery
yielding either a further gain or loss of e4. Otherwise, Left yields
e4. Similarly, Right yields either e10 or e4 and an additional
50/50 lottery yielding either a gain ofe4 or a loss ofe4, both with
50% probability. Thus, the choice between left and right amounts
to whether the subject prefers to apportion a zero-mean e4 risk
to a state with relatively high wealth (left), or to a state with
relatively low wealth (right). A choice for left (right) indicates
that the decision maker can better cope with the zero-mean e4
risk when she has relatively more (less) wealth, implying that
she is prudent (imprudent). The precise lotteries that were used
are given in Table 1. In line with the existing literature (Deck
and Schlesinger, 2010, 2014; Noussair et al., 2014), we use the
number of prudent choices that a subject makes as a measure
of the individual strength of prudence. If an individual chooses
the prudent option in 6 or more of the 10 decisions she takes, we
classify the individual as prudent. Analogously, if she chooses the
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FIGURE 1 | Example of a choice from phase 2 of the experiment.
TABLE 1 | Prudent lotteries used and choice proportions.
Choice # Lottery displayed Lottery displayed % of instances in which
on left on right prudent choice was made
1 (10+(4_−4)_4) (10_4+(4_−4)) 88.0***
2 (6+(1_−1)_1) (6_1+(1_−1)) 79.5***
3 (12+(2_−2)_3) (12_3+(2_−2)) 79.5***
4 (9+(2_−2)_3) (9_3+(2_−2)) 74.7***
5 (8+(4_−4)_4) (8_4+(4_−4)) 83.1***
6 (6+(1_−1)_3) (6_3+(1_−1)) 73.5***
7 (7+(2_−2)_2) (7_2+(2_−2)) 85.5***
8 (11+(3_−3)_3) (11_3+(3_−3)) 88.0***
9 (13+(4_−4)_4) (13_4+(4_−4)) 85.5***
10 (12+(2_−2)_2) (12_2+(2_−2)) 86.7***
(x_y) indicates a lottery with an equal probability of receiving either x or y; outcomes in
euros; *** indicates significant difference at 1% level from random choice between left and
right option, binomial test, two-sided.
prudent option in 5 or fewer instances, the individual is said to be
imprudent.
In the third phase of the experiment, cognitive ability is
measured using Raven’s advanced progressive matrices test
(Raven et al., 1998), a protocol commonly used to measure fluid
intelligence. The task involves choosing the correct one out of
eight possible alternatives to complete a 3-by-3 matrix of abstract
symbols in a consistent pattern. Due to the limited amount of
time available in our sessions, we used the short form of the test
proposed by Bors and Stokes (1998) that consists of 12 tasks.
Subjects were given a total of 10 min to complete the 12 tasks,
and were allowed to revise previous answers if time allowed.
The final phase of the experiment consists of a questionnaire
designed to obtain a classification of personality. More
specifically, we administer the 10-item Big Five personality
measure developed by Gosling et al. (2003). This measure allows
one to classify individual differences in personality into five broad
dimensions: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
neuroticism, and openness to new experiences, by registering
applicability of 10 items regarding subject’s personality on a scale
from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). In addition,
background information of subjects regarding age, gender, study,
year of study was gathered. There is some previous evidence
that the dimensions of openness and extraversion correlate
negatively with risk aversion, and neuroticism, agreeableness
and conscientiousness correlating positively (Nicholson et al.,
2005; Becker et al., 2012). We are unaware of any prior work
correlating personality characteristics and prudence.
Thus, for each participant, we observe the emotional reaction
caused by being exposed to risk and the emotional reaction
caused by experiencing the outcome of a risky lottery (phase
1), as well as a measure of the degree of prudence (phase 2), of
cognitive ability (phase 3), and of personality dimensions (phase
4). Figure 2 below shows a timeline of the experiment.
To avoid potential income effects on the measure of prudence
[such as Thaler and Johnson’s (1990) house money effect] and
to provide incentives for truthfully reporting preferences, the
random incentive mechanism was used. That is, subjects were
informed from the outset that at the end of the experiment, phase
1 or phase 2 would be randomly selected with equal probability. If
the first phase is selected, the observed outcome of one of the ten
of the lotteries (randomly selected) count toward the participant’s
earnings. If the second phase is selected, the computer randomly
selects one of the ten pairs of lotteries. The outcome of the
chosen lottery in that pair would then count toward earnings.
On top of these earnings, subjects received e0.50 for each of
the correct answers to the Raven test in phase 3 as well as a
fixed participation fee of e2. On average, subjects earned e12.18
during the experiment.
One of our design choices merits some further comment.
We have chosen to track, without attempting to influence, the
emotions and arousal level that our participants exhibit during
our task. An alternative would be to induce different emotional
or arousal states and compare the resulting decisions, as many
other authors have done. The induction of emotions is well
suited to addressing questions regarding the causal effects of
emotional variables on decision making, and is a powerful
tool for addressing many if not most important questions in
emotion research. The design we have chosen is meant to
document correlates of prudent decision making, rather than
causal relationships. We consider whether those who tend to
exhibit particular emotions, greater or less arousal, and positive
or negative emotional state after exposure to and experience with
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FIGURE 2 | Timing of Experiment.
lotteries, exhibit more or less prudence in subsequent decisions.
Identifying such correlates of prudence in decision making is the
purpose of this research.
RESULTS
A clear majority of individuals in the study were prudent. 42.17%
(35 of 83) of participants made a prudent decision at every
opportunity. Another 46.99% (39 of 83) made a prudent choice
between 6 and 9 times, indicating that they chose prudently in a
majority of instances in which they had an opportunity to do so.
Thus, 89.16% of individuals are classified as prudent. 10.84% (9
of 83) of participants made fewer than 6 prudent choices are thus
classified as imprudent. The fact that a majority of participants
is prudent is consistent with the previous literature (Deck and
Schlesinger, 2010, 2014; Ebert and Wiesen, 2011, 2014; Noussair
et al., 2014).
Figure 3 illustrates the average emotional state in phase 1 of
the experiment for those who made 0–5, between 6 and 9, and
who made 10 prudent decisions in phase 2. The panels on the left
indicate the average value of the exposure emotions, measured
at the time that the lotteries are displayed in phase 1. Those
on the right are the feedback emotions, those registered at the
time that each of the phase 1 lotteries is resolved. The strength
of the various emotions is typically similar at the exposure as
at the feedback point. The figure shows that those who exhibit
more negative valence, as well as stronger anger, surprise and
disgust, and lower happiness, when viewing the lotteries, make
more prudent decisions. The results are similar whether exposure
or feedback emotions are considered.
To make these impressions more precise and to control for
other potential influences on prudence, we conduct Poisson
count regressions in which the number of prudent choices is
the dependent variable. The estimates for feedback emotions
are reported in Table 2, and those for exposure emotions are in
Table 3.3
3Subjects were told to pay attention to their screen and were asked not to touch
their face during the experiment. This ensured that we were able to gather facial
expression data for the vast majority of decisions. There are 60 to 69 for missing
observations for the results in Table 2 and 110 to 116 missing observations for the
results reported inTable 3. These missing observations are instances when subjects
looked away from their computer screens or covered part of their faces with their
hands.
In results 1–4, we report our results concerning the correlates
of prudence. The first result below indicates that there is a
negative correlation between the overall valence of emotional
state and prudence. Those in a more positive emotional state are
less prudent.
Result 1: Positivity of Emotional State,
When Facing Risky Lotteries, Correlates
with Imprudence
Support for Result 1
Table 2 contains estimates of Poisson count regressions in
which the number of prudent choices is the dependent variable.
The valence variable is evaluated at the feedback stage. The
coefficients of valence in specifications (1), (2), (4), and (5)
indicate that valence is a significant predictor of decisions. In
all four regressions, the coefficient of valence is negative and
significant at the p < 0.05 level in three specifications and p <
0.01 level in one specification. Those in a more positive state
are more imprudent, while more negative states are associated
with prudence. In Table 3, we report the results from similar
regressions with valence measured at the exposure stage. In
all four specifications in which it appears, the variable Valence
is negative in sign, though it is marginally significant only in
specification (5). Overall, in our view, the balance of the evidence
indicates a negative relationship between positivity of emotional
state and prudence.4
The second dimension of emotional state that we consider
is arousal. While positive emotional state is associated with less
prudence, we find that stronger arousal is associated with greater
prudence. However, as we describe in the supporting argument
for result 2, it is the change in arousal from the initial level that is
correlated with subsequent decisions. The level of arousal at the
4We also considered whether the difference in valence at the time of feedback,
between instances of positive and negative outcomes of the lottery, predict
prudence in decision making in phase 2. It is presumed that individuals will tend
to have more positive valence after a favorable than an unfavorable outcome.
However, for those who have a relatively high value of the difference, Valdiff =
Valence(Favorable outcome) − Valence(Unfavorable outcome), might be more
prudent. This is because, if a positive emotional state leads to more risk taking, and
a negative emotional state leads to lower risk taking, individuals with a relatively
high value of Valdiff might be more willing to apportion the unavoidable risk to
the high income state. This would lead to a positive correlation between Valdiff
and prudent decision making. However, no such correlation appears in the data.
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FIGURE 3 | Emotional profiles and the number of prudent decisions.
time of exposure to or feedback from the lotteries in phase 1 is
uncorrelated with the number of prudent choices in phase 2.
Result 2: Increases in Arousal When Facing
Risky Lotteries Correlates with Prudent
Decision Making
Support for Result 2
Specifications (2), (4), and (5) in Tables 2, 3 reveal that the
absolute amount of arousal in phase 1 is not correlated with
prudence in decision making. However, as specification (3)
shows, the results are different if changes in arousal from the
beginning of the session to the moment of measurement are
considered. In equation (3), the emotional variables are the actual
value of the emotion at the moment of feedback or exposure in
phase 1, minus the initial level at the beginning of the session
prior to the start of phase 1. In both tables, the results show
that overall arousal level does not presage more prudent decision
making, but an increase in arousal when confronted with
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TABLE 2 | Number of prudent choices as a function of emotional, ability, and personality measures; feedback emotions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gender 0.024 0.014 0.003 0.021 0.031 0.017 0.029
Arousal −0.258 0.283* −0.276 −0.252
Valence −0.086** −0.102** 0.039 −0.090** −0.108***
Raven score 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.027***
Extraverted 0.012 0.019*
Agreeableness −0.005 −0.009
Neuroticism 0.009 0.006
Conscientiousness −0.027*** −0.028***
Openness to experiences 0.026** 0.018
Happy 0.066 −0.010
Sad 0.086 0.212
Scared −0.319 −0.609
Angry 0.121** 0.082
Disgusted 0.327*** 0.360***
Surprised 0.191*** 0.153***
Obs 770 Obs 770 Obs 761 Obs 770 Obs 770 Obs 770 Obs 770
Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10
Dependent variable is the number of prudent decisions [0, 10] made by an individual in phase 2 of the experiment. In all equations other than (3), the emotion and arousal variables are
those averaged over the 10 s after the resolution of the 10 lotteries in phase 1. In Equation (3), the emotion and arousal variables are the difference between those in the 60 s before the
start of phase 1 and those at the time of the resolution of the lotteries. Regressions use panel data format that adjusts the standard errors for repeated measures.
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
TABLE 3 | Number of prudent choices as a function of emotional, ability, and personality measures; exposure emotions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gender −0.0004 −0.008 −0.015 −0.0004 0.006 −0.012 −0.003
Arousal −0.016 0.279** −0.006 −0.071
Valence −0.055 −0.054 0.026 −0.055 −0.063*
Raven score 0.025 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.027***
Extraverted 0.020* 0.023**
Agreeableness −0.005 −0.006
Neuroticism 0.006 0.004
Conscientiousness −0.025** −0.027***
Openness to experiences 0.019 0.015
Happy −0.085 −0.114
Sad 0.167 0.242*
Scared −0.150 −0.341
Angry 0.066 0.047
Disgusted 0.217*** 0.238***
Surprised 0.160*** 0.131***
Obs 720 Obs 720 Obs 714 Obs 720 Obs 720 Obs 720 Obs 720
Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10 Groups 10
Dependent variable is the number of prudent decisions [0, 10] made by an individual in phase 2 of the experiment. In all equations other than (3), the emotion and arousal variables are
those averaged over the first 10 s that the 10 lotteries in phase 1 are displayed. In equation (3), the emotion and arousal variables are the difference between those in the 60 s before
the start of phase 1 and those at the time of the display of the lotteries. Regressions use panel data format that adjusts the standard errors for repeated measures.
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
risky lotteries does correlate with a greater number of prudent
choices.
We now turn to the individual emotions as correlates of
decisions. The principal pattern in the data is that more
intense emotions, in particular surprise and disgust, correlate
with greater prudence. There is some evidence that greater
anger and sadness also are associated with more prudence.
Fear and happiness do not exhibit a significant relation
with prudent decision making. Our findings are reported as
result 3.
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Result 3: Stronger Emotions Are
Correlated with Greater Prudence
Support for Result 3
The results are shown in specifications (6) and (7) in Table 2 for
emotions in the feedback stage and in Table 3 for the exposure
stage. The tables reveal a significantly positive relationship
between disgust and surprise with the number of prudent
decisions made in all relevant equations. Sadness and anger are
each significant in one of the four specifications in which they
appear. In all cases, a greater value of the emotion correlates with
greater prudence.
The last result considers the other correlates of prudence that
our design permits us to evaluate.
Result 4: There Are No Gender Differences
in the Average Level of prudence.
Prudence is Positively Correlated with
Cognitive Ability. Prudence Is Negatively
Correlated with Conscientiousness
Support for Result 4
In all of the specifications reported in Tables 2, 3, the variable
Gender is insignificant. The variable Raven, the score of an
individual on the Raven’s test, is significant at the 1% level
in all estimated equations in which it appears. Furthermore,
none of the big 5 personality traits is significant other than
conscientiousness.
DISCUSSION
We observe that those who experience more positive valence at
the time of the resolution of risky lotteries tend to make less
prudent subsequent decisions. The same correlation obtains if
valence at the time of presentation of the lotteries is considered,
although this effect is only marginally significant. This result is
similar in spirit to those obtained for risk aversion by a number of
authors, who find that negative emotional state is associated with
greater risk aversion. There are a number of possible explanations
for this correlation. If a negative emotional state prompts
more pessimistic beliefs, as under the Affective Generalization
Hypothesis, an individual with negative valence might believe
that the bad state is more likely to occur than the good state. If
this is the case, and the agent is risk averse, she will apportion
an unavoidable zero-mean risk to what she believes is the less
likely state, i.e., the one yielding the relatively high outcome.
Alternatively, it may be the case that a negative emotional state
prompts individuals to behave defensively by maximizing their
minimum payoff. This pattern would translate into declining
to accept zero-mean risks when given an opportunity to do so
(risk aversion), and apportioning unavoidable risks into relatively
high income states when possible (prudence). Future research
would be needed to distinguish between the hypotheses that a
negative emotional state leads individuals to apply a heuristic in
which they maximize their minimum payoff and the alternative
that negative emotions prompt more risk averse as well as more
prudent decisions.
We also observe that increases in arousal during the phase 1
task, which can be interpreted as integral arousal, is positively
correlated with prudence in subsequent decisions. It may be
the case that greater arousal, like more negative valence, leads
to more pessimistic beliefs. The consequence would be that
the high income state is viewed as less likely, and that a risk
averse individual would allocate the risk to what she believes
is the less likely state, and generate behavior consistent with
prudence. Alternatively, arousal may lead to a focus on relatively
unfavorable outcomes and choices that maximize payoff under
the worst possible outcome.While some prior research associates
greater arousal with risk taking (Haim, 1994), other work
argues that underarousal increases risk taking as individuals seek
arousing stimuli (Schmidt et al., 2013). Here, it may be the case
that underaroused individuals place the risk in the low income
state as stimulation to increase their level of emotional arousal.
An overall pattern emerges with respect to the relationship
between individual emotions and prudence in decision making.
This is that stronger emotions are associated with more prudent
decision making. The result is also similar to, and might
be viewed as somewhat of an extension of, those reported
by Nguyen and Noussair (2014), who also find that stronger
emotions correlate with risk aversion, though they observe their
relationship for a different set of emotions. Explaining why there
is a relationship between more intense emotions and prudence
is beyond the scope of what this experiment can test, but the
explanations may be similar to those proposed for the correlation
between prudence and valence or arousal described above. Strong
emotions might influence beliefs about the likelihood of each
state or encourage the use of heuristics such as the maximization
of minimum payoff.
The absence of a gender effect and the strong link between
prudence and cognitive ability echoes the results of Noussair
et al. (2014), who observed the same patterns in a large
demographically representative sample of the Dutch population.
The emerging pattern with regard to gender differences in
prudence contrasts with that for risk aversion, in which
gender differences are widely observed (see e.g., Eckel and
Grossman, 2008). The particular relationship we observe between
personality and prudence is surprising for a couple of reasons.
The first reason is that the Big Five personality characteristics and
risk aversion exhibit a pattern of correlation that is both strong
and intuitive to interpret. Here, the relationship is relatively weak
with only conscientiousness exhibiting a robust relationship. The
second reason is that because prudence is associated with high
cognitive ability and precautionary savings, one might think
that it would also be correlated with greater conscientiousness,
rather than less, as we observe here. However, the effect of
conscientiousness remains in regressions (not reported here
but available from the authors), in which Raven’s score is
left out of the specification. The effect of conscientiousness
becomes insignificant when the emotional state variables of
valence, arousal, and specific emotions are not included in
the specification, suggesting that emotional states may affect
individuals’ decisions differently, depending on their personality
profile. Conducting an analysis of the mediating and moderating
relationships of such a large number of personality characteristics
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and emotional variables on prudence would require a much
larger data set than we gathered for this study, but we believe it
would be worthwhile to pursue such an analysis in future work.
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